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Jurisdiction relates to the competence to pass laws, build effective administrative
processes, facilitate inward capital flows, encourage education and support the
development of a climate conducive to economic growth. This paper argues that
jurisdictional capacity provides the foundation for an economic development
trajectory which has been successfully deployed in various small, resource-poor,
often island, territories. The components of such jurisdictional capacity—in
terms of administrative autonomy, island identity, legal powers and the potential
for rapid policy deployment—will be referred to for a critical examination of
‘The Cyprus Question’. The analysis suggests the partition of Cyprus into two
separate sovereign states as solution.
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Communities without powers, which are not in any sense subjects of their
own fate, living on accidental fragments of geography whether of land or
sea, may not even realize that their economic development could be
thwarted, not because of the absence, mismanagement, flight or otherwise
of ‘material factors of production’—capital, labour, entrepreneurship—
but because they cannot harness jurisdictional leverage (Baldacchino and
Milne, 2000, p 230).
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The economic development equation
The Economist, that enduring scion of liberalism, once again in April 2001 paid
due homage to the ‘remarkable’ progress of Iceland, a sovereign island state of
280 000 people , with a profile of  i ts Prime Minister , David Oddsson
(Economist, 2001). What is the secret of its success? Claims the Prime Minister
in the same feature: ‘It’s just that we keep forgetting how small we are’.
A valid statement when one remembers that, for many years, successful
economic development has been equated with large-scale manufacturing
operations utilizing mass production techniques and large workforces in
centralized production sites. The geographical implication of such assumed
imperatives has been the concentration of large factories in urbanized areas,
close to large labour pools and consumer markets. Some opportunities have
existed for decentralized branch plants in semi-peripheral regions, in the frame-
work of an international division of labour. These may have provided precious
jobs, investment and technological expertise while generating some demand for
local services. But the linkages established with the local ‘host’ economy have
been minimal in such ‘enclave’ operations; technological transfer has been poor
or outdated, while foreign capital reveals its footloose character when relocation
proves a viable proposition.
The introduction of new production and information technologies, corporate
restructuring and the rise of global competition in the last decades of the
twentieth century have obliged firms to re-evaluate the bases of competitiveness
in manufacturing. Increasingly, outsourcing, long-term subcontracting relation-
ships such as franchizing and specialized or flexible production for niche
markets have created new opportunities for small firms to compete successfully
in manufacturing activity.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that the long-term evolution of industrial
regimes does not lead to a steady and irreversible elimination of small firms.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) continue to contribute vigorously
to economic growth and to the creation of sustainable employment, a con-
tribution all the more readily evident in the context of massive lay-offs from
large firms and long-term, structural unemployment. This may be largely the
result of the SME capacity for flexibility and innovation which enables these
same firms to respond more quickly to structural changes and to adapt just as
rapidly to changing consumer taste and demand.
Strange that these advantages of flexibility and innovative capacity available
to small firms have often been neglected in discussions of economic develop-
ment for small territories. Or, rather, that what has been seen in an envious light
in relation to SMEs should be looked upon through a much more pessimistic
and cynical lens in relation to small territories.
This article
This article will outline the resourcefulness inherent in the jurisdictional
capacity of a small territory, as broken down in terms of four interrelated
propositions of administrative autonomy, island identity, legal powers for the
sake of priming economic capacity, and the potential for rapid policy deploy-
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ment. It will argue that jurisdictional capacity provides the foundation for an
economic development trajectory which has been successfully emulated by
various other small territories. Furthermore, the long drawn out impasse of ‘The
Cyprus Question’ is effectively cheating North Cyprus from capitalizing on the
opportunities afforded by this route, because, rather than in spite, of its small
size. Contrary to what is implied in David Oddsson’s statement quoted above,
one needs precisely to remember how small one is—not to load onto oneself the
debilitating myths of fragility, vulnerability or peripherality—but in order to
exploit the fact that it is smallness which facilitates the capture and the deploy-
ment of jurisdictional capacity. It is hoped that this discussion will provide
insights that can then feed into and drive public policy debate on ‘The Cyprus
Question’, possibly kickstarting a solution.
Enter small territories
Small territories are a diverse group of administrative units (including sovereign
states), often islands, in peripheral regions with a discrete land mass and
relatively low population levels (typically, of fewer than one million residents).
In these micro-territories the obstacles to economic viability are, to say the
least, daunting:
c the size of the domestic market is small;
c there is an accentuated openness to external shocks (such as price
fluctuations or economic disasters);
c there are h igh transport costs,  especially in  handling,  freight and
insurance;
c there is an inability to exploit economies of scale, leading to inhibiting
non-competitiveness of local products;
c there are often very limited linkages to the local, small economy, which
tends to be biased towards the production of a single crop, product or
service;
c there may be a lack of skilled wo/manpower, which, where available,
tends to relocate to larger and better paying employment locations;
c there are often relatively high state-induced costs (such as entrance and
compliance fees and tax revenue collection);
c there may be a dearth of effective and inexpensive support and infra-
structural services, such as telecommunications and venture capital
(Fischer & Encontre, 1998).
The conventional economic answer to such structural mishaps has been to
forget about manufacturing and concentrate by default on services. Scale
considerations and transport costs may thus be circumvented. The ‘island
identity’ and condition may actually help to market specific services in external
markets—such as tourism and offshore banking—with fair prospects of success
(King, 1993; Hampton and Abbott, 1999). A limited range of exclusive quality
products associated with such services appears to stand a good chance of
penetrating foreign market niches.1
Fair but not quite flawless. Various small territories are doing extremely
well, even in manufacturing.2 How can they be, given what appear to be such
JURISDICTIONAL SELF-RELIANCE FOR SMALL ISLAND TERRITORIES
351
insurmountable problems as classified above? There is indeed an alternative
approach to what appears to be an essentially economic problem. What small
territories lack in economic capacity could be handsomely compensated for in
terms of jurisdictional capacity.
Jurisdiction relates to the competence of a state and its structures to pass
laws, build effective and efficient administrative processes, facilitate the inward
movement of capital, encourage education and training, cultivate and support
the development of a climate conducive to economic growth. It should be fair
to argue that, ceteris paribus, states, by definition, enjoy the highest level of
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, and conversely, the exercise of jurisdiction is brought
about by the existence of a de facto (though not always de jure) jurisdictional
status, the epitome of which is political sovereignty. However, there is a key
difference between merely enjoying jurisdictional status on one hand and
translating that strategically into an economic policy tool on the other. The
capacity may be there, but is it recognized and is it deployed properly? Small
territories—sovereign or otherwise—may easily credit themselves with the
purported deficiencies they are meant to carry, failing to recognize that they
have specific attributes at their disposal with which they can better exploit this
strange resource, ‘the politics of economics’ (Bartmann, 1996). 
Offshore economics as political economy
Developing and priming the magnetism to act (rather than react) as an
essentially offshore economy is what translates as the success story behind the
economic development of small territories. Key ingredients thereof are ‘the
governing wits’ described by Edward Warrington:
a large fund of experience in state-craft; well-tempered procedures for
taking and modifying decisions; subtlety, sophistication and tenacity in
negotiating issues with larger powers. (Warrington, 1998, p 105)
Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read term the same features ‘the quality of
endogenous policy formulation and implementation’ (Armstrong and Read,
1998), assets which can make up handsomely for lack of land, labour, capital,
markets or finance. Through the rediscovery of ‘political economy’, one there-
fore recognizes the economic resourcefulness of erstwhile mundane, political
and administrative instruments: law and policy making.
Although political economy was always a contested ideological terrain, there
is a broad consensus about what conventionally constitutes, or at least has in the
past constituted, its fundamental concern. This is the interaction of plan and
market; of state and civil society; of a visible hand and an invisible hand; of
commodity exchange and redistributive exchange; or, again in different yet
more familiar terms, of ‘good old’ politics and economics. Yet neither of these
two realms is to be seen as a primary or totalizing discourse; nor is one
‘subject’ a conceptual lens through which to rudely perceive and criticize the
other. Their relationship is interactive and dialectical, apart from supple-
mentary, to the chagrin and discomfort of both economists and political
scientists (Polanyi, 1957).
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A small island signature
I have elsewhere documented how smallness and islandness can provide the
physical–geographical underpinnings for a historically autonomous adminis-
tration; the economic stimulus for a ‘political economy’ approach to growth,
development and prosperity; the cultural stimulus for a unitary, communal
identity; and the social fabric to manage all this in a flexible, rapidly reactive
manner (Baldacchino, 2000). This is perhaps the closest we may have yet come
to grasping the full meaning of the signature, or ‘ecology’, of small island
territories (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1996).
Below I will attempt to translate these ideas into the context of the divided
island of Cyprus. My knowledge of Cyprus remains that of ‘an outsider looking
in’ and will draw primarily on: (1) my three visits to the southern part of the
island since 1996; (2) my interest in Cyprus as a partner EU applicant state
placed in the same analytical basket as Malta by the European Commission for
some years; as well as (3) my understanding of developments on Cyprus as they
have come to my attention, being as I am a fellow Mediterranean with an
interest in island affairs.
Inter-island rivalries
But first, allow me to present an illustrative introduction. It appears that, just as
islands are often short of physical space (Dommen, 1980), they also appear
short of the necessary cultural space to accommodate two sufficiently large
ethnic groupings.3 Multi-insularity in archipelagic island states has had a
tendency to breed island-specific nationalisms within the same administrative
unit. Examples of this include Mauritius and Rodrigues, Antigua and Barbuda,
St Kitts and Nevis and the latter’s failed recent constitutional attempt at going it
alone, Savaï and Upolu (Samoa), the jostling for supremacy amongst the ‘ABC’
islands of the Dutch Caribbean (Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao); the refusal of
Mayotte to join the independent nation of the Comoros; the micro-dramatic
Anguilla incident, and my own Malta and Gozo (Streeten, 1993). The culmina-
tion of such island-specific tensions is to be found in the independence
discussions of the Gilbert and Ellice islands, which decided to go their separate
ways as the two independent states of small Kiribati and even smaller Tuvalu.
Such an event has led to the dubbing of these quite common traits towards
insular political devolution as the ‘Tuvalu Effect’. 
But confrontations can be even more violent when there is no inter-island
channel separating the contending factions. Recent events on East Timor bear
witness to this. François Doumenge candidly reminds us of Sri Lanka, with the
warring Tamils and Sinhalese; of Fiji, with tensions between the Melanesian
Fijians and the Indo-Fijians; and of Nouvelle Caledonie, divided between the
white settlers and the indigenous Kanak tribes (Doumenge, 1998). Mauritius,
the proud rainbow nation, has endured its own ethnic violence in recent years
(Bunwaree, 2001); not forgetting the Republican Roman Catholics and Unionist
Protestants on the divided social island of Ulster in Northern Ireland. If it is any
consolation, Cyprus is not the world’s only painfully divided island.
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An insular identity
The state of play in Cyprus is one where the Turkish and Greek communities
have assumed a national identity that overshadows and subordinates anything
which may have been genuinely Cypriot. The 1960 independence constitution
effectively legitimated and entrenched the ‘two nations’, and their would-be
guarantors, within the newly independent island state. Differences in language,
customs, religion and history between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot com-
munities were not historically integrated into a cultural and political melting
pot, providing a mélange that would have been more clearly and indigenously
Cypriot than either Greek or Turkish. This was a difficult if not impossible task,
considering the long drawn out differential power relationship and animosities
between the two groups. Thus, the emergence of a new and culturally distinct
Cypriot nation, which would have provided the basis for a truly independent
Cypriot nation-state, was historically pre-empted. Similar to many other
territories carved from colonial empires, political independence may have
created a state of Cyprus in 1960 but not a Cypriot nation. Indeed, the inde-
pendence constitution cemented the differences and distinctiveness of the two
ethnic groups. The exogenous reference points—Greece and Turkey respec-
tively—have always maintained a strong grip over the mind-frames of the
locals.4 This psychological gridlock—of which the quest for Enosis is one clear
and dramatic expression—has become even more potent since 1974. Greek
flags are everywhere in the South; there, Greece is the putative defending
power, the cultural reference point and the main broker for Cyprus’s drive to
join the EU. In the north, Turkey replaces Greece, many Turkish Cypriots have
permanently emigrated, while significant residents forthcoming from Anatolia
have given their share to stamp a more distinctly Turkish, rather than Turkish
Cypriot, demographic profile. In a way the 1974 intervention by Turkey
crystallized the de facto cultural schism of the island. It has led to what appears
to be the natural expression of the stubborn historical existence of the two main
national identities, to the exclusion of the potentially indigenous third. Thus, the
unitary insular mind-set characteristic of many island territories as a main
coagulator and common denominator of social life does not appear to be present
on Cyprus. Instead, Cyprus is a clear case of a dualist or ‘bi-communal’ society,
with each part having its own deep-rooted nationalism. Unitarism in Cyprus is
intra-insular; the dynamics of social compression, strong personal contacts,
clannish politics and societal corporatism are alive and well, but they are
geographically devolved to each of the two divided portions of the island.
Perhaps we must recognize this situation by refraining from referring to Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, using instead the nouns of Cypriot Greeks and
Cypriot Turks. Is it a coincidence that Northern Cyprus is hailed as a Turkish
Republic?
Administrative autonomy
It follows from this situation that each of the two entities on Cyprus are de facto
administrative units. They thus equip their respective actors with the possession
and utilization of political instruments. It is on the basis of such discretion that
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internal powers and initiatives can be entertained in the first place. The
legitimacy of such powers and their deployment in the eyes of external players
is a separate issue. So is the exercise of external powers, such as international
relations, or striking bilateral and multilateral agreements. Fiscal policy,
education and training policy, economic development policy and transportation
policy can all be affected by the administrative powers of the two separate
communities. It is probably the extent to which the two communities can
command enough room for manoeuvre from Greece and Turkey respectively
which suggests itself as a thorny and sensitive political issue, since this juris-
dictional space is essential to develop and deploy the magnetism required for
economic resourcefulness. The lack of international recognition for the ‘Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as an independent state certainly inhibits the
opportunity for extending rentier overtures, or any other export-driven policy
initiatives for that matter, except to the obvious Turkey. As long as ‘the
other side’ remains a real threat to peace and stability on the island, such
tensions with the paternal foreign power are overridden and lose their relative
importance. However, if the threat of the historical other across the Green Line
disappears, then the jurisdictional balance with the putative benevolent patrons
comes rapidly into centre stage. It is also here that membership of the European
Union, in whichever format, may provide precious leverage to either of the two
de facto Cypriot jurisdictions to bypass and override the enormous clout
currently enjoyed over the island’s affairs by both Greece and Turkey. Of
course, statehood is a precondition for eventual EU membership; barring the
unlikely onset of a one-Cypriot nation-state—a condition which, as I have
argued above, may have never really existed—then the other plausible route to
statehood is for each of the divided portions of Cyprus to proceed to being two
independent nation-states, each legitimately responsible for the territory they
currently administer, possibly within some kind of federalist arrangement.
Partition is not the shame of Cyprus, but possibly its solution.
Jurisdiction as power
Small territories afford a most imaginative assortment of autonomous statuses
precisely to maximize the opportunities and benefits arising from this key tenet:
that jurisdictional status is essential for amassing that political resourcefulness
which is in turn essential for crafting an attractive and competitive economic
space which attracts foreign players—be they investors, financiers, retired
pensioners, agents, traders, tourists, aid donors or benefactors. Jurisdiction
begets power. Power over banking and insurance laws and regulations is
essential in order to consider an offshore banking industry, or to generate funds
from internal sources for business development. Power over exports, imports
and especially throughputs lies at the root of the promotion of export volume
or transhipment services. Power over taxation enables a relatively low-tax
environment, an evidently powerful contributor to that magnetism intended to
draw in myriad forms of foreign investment. Power over natural resources
includes procedures and incentives for adding value to primary industries,
especially agriculture, viticulture and fisheries, areas of economic activity
which remain a priority to many European states, and particularly so as long as
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the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union defies downsizing. But
there are also subsoil or extra-territorial resources to contend with, including oil
and gas deposits and fishing zones. Finally, power over education, training,
labour markets and industrial policy affects the characteristics of the local
labour force, their expectations and skills repertoire, and the ‘goodness of fit’ of
such a supply with employer demand for those expectations and skills, locally
or abroad (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000, passim).
Potential for rapid change
Finally, there is the potential for rapid policy deployment and re-deployment, a
key skill in relation to the turbulence of a ‘just-in-time’ economic scenario
(Trist, 1980). Small island communities appear particularly endowed to fulfil
the ‘small is beautiful’ adage, mainly as a consequence of three socioeconomic
characteristics. These are in turn tendencies exacerbated by the manner in
which the geographically bounded, structural totality of a small island universe
is characterized by territorial compactness and population density at the demo-
graphic level and by social visibility, intimacy and excessive rôle fuzziness and
overlap at a social level (Baldacchino, 1997, chapter 4). 
This results, first, in a peculiar social matrix which engenders rapid multi-
plier, or ‘knock on’, effects. This also implies that there is a certain ease of
observing the effects of policy on practice, as well as of effecting changes or
fine-tuning to such policy. A British anthropologist described this feature in this
way:
Approach to a single, isolate problem leads extraordinarily rapidly to all
parts of the complex more quickly and completely than we have observed
elsewhere. (Bowen-Jones, 1972) 
Second, there is the sheer inescapability of multiple networking. Islanders are
obliged, whether they like it or not, to operate within a complex mesh of
relationships, whereby individuals relate over and over again in the context of
different rôle sets. This is a powerful cultural characteristic, and fosters a
repertoire of ‘soft’, intimacy and conflict management skills (Lowenthal, 1987).
These tools can come into good stead in economic activities where personal
relationships are fundamental. It may appear at face value to be an exaggeration,
but it may nevertheless prove true. In a small territory, two phone calls can get
you to anyone, including the Premier. Everyone may not really know everyone
else; yet everyone is likely to know someone who does (Farrugia, 1993). 
Third, there is encouragement of the personalization of governing institu-
tions. The danger here lies in systemic dysfunctionality, arising out of incum-
bents who are swayed by alternative loyalties and/or alternative operational
procedures while occupying critical posts. Otherwise, there is the possibility of
a very rapid identification of who controls access to resources or decisions.
Thus, customization of service is more easily engineered and a ‘turn-around
time’ to react to a proposal is potentially very rapid. This is the character
of a ‘soft state’ (Hyden, 1983), where institutional decisions are transparent
and readily identified—often correctly—as the initiative of specific individuals
(Schahczenski, 1992).
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I am convinced that these three features exist in North Cyprus as they also
exist in many other social island settings. Their manifestation may escape the
gaze of external observers, who, in adopting the neoclassical paradigm with its
belief in bureaucratic and impersonal organization, may diagnose the same
dynamics as pathological, unfortunate relics of premodernity or even as corrupt
practices. Citizens of small islands would, of course, know better.
Conclusion
One must not fail to recognize that there are distinct advantages in being small,
insular and peripheral—if only because this troika of features prevents the
debilitating neoclassical paradigm of ‘development’—generated in the core and
heartland—from exercising a hegemonic influence on policy makers, academics
and the business community out on the fringe. Such precepts—based and biased
on economies of scale and land-located industrial production—never worked in
these locations anyway. This makes the small island more flexibly disposed to
consider fresh approaches to development; and being small and away, there
might be less resistance from the status quo in stalling novel departures that
may prove to be more sustainable:
great change often happens not at the centre where the old ideas have the
greatest power, but at the periphery, where they are weakest. (Paterson,
1996)
Small territories may come across as accidental fragments of geography,
whether of land or sea; even as drifting vessels, the flotsam and jetsam of
empire (Baldacchino, 1994; Guillebaud, 1976; Naipaul, 1972). But such
metaphors are not to be misconstrued as suggesting communities without
powers, communities who are not in any sense subjects of their own fate. The
harnessing of jurisdictional leverage is the novel, yet sound and pragmatic,
departure from orthodox economic development theory.
North Cyprus can only gain by critically observing the manner in which other
small, often remote, poor and marginalized island territories, or parts thereof,
have capitalized on their innate disposition as open economies and open
societies to provide a decent, even enviable, quality of life for their citizens.
Such territories have discarded the economic self-reliance paradigm, because
they could never have taken it seriously anyway. In its place, they have been
assiduously crafting and perfecting a different type of self-reliance, a juris-
dictional self-reliance which guarantees their control over legal, fiscal and
administrative instruments. In so doing, they are demonstrating the paradoxical
advantages of their economic dependence. They are corroborating the solemn
statement by The Economist: ‘The curse of the periphery is a myth’ (Economist,
1998). They may be insignificant players on the world stage; yet they are
capable of managing their insignificance remarkably well.
In Cyprus one continues to bicker over the modalities of a myth. The one
‘federalist’ or ‘confederalist’ solution which makes most sense is not a political
one but a commercial and diplomatic one between two sovereign states who are
confident in the security afforded by the recognition of their sovereignty. Their
relative size and population would thus present no problems of relative status,
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inevitable in any form of bi-national federal solution. They need to tap their
respective diaspora, not to lobby for an impossible political solution in a
military framework but to advance the commercial interests of two separate
small island economies, which are likely to become each other’s main trading
partner and tourism destination. They need to widen their clients and sponsors
beyond Greece and Turkey, respectively, tapping broader sources of foreign
investment. 
The tragedy unfolding in Cyprus for at least the past half-century reads as a
continuous obsessive pursuit of an elusive recipe for a single Cypriot nation.
My reading of history over the various periods, and of the mind-frame and
nationalist identities of the locals, suggests otherwise. The island imagination is
a dualist one. Lasting peace, international relations and economic pursuits as
global players are being effectively thwarted for both communities and
forestalled by diplomatic gridlock. The run-up to potential EU membership for
Cyprus is now acting to galvanize diplomatic efforts once again, although it is
still too early to espy any breakthroughs in the existing impasse.5 I look forward
to the time when the division of the island of Cyprus raises as many eyebrows
as that of Hispaniola, Borneo, New Guinea or Saint Martin/Sint Maarten.6
Notes
I am grateful to the organizers of the conference on Small Island States in a Changing
Global Milieu at the Eastern Mediterranean University of Northern Cyprus, held in May
2001. I thank the University of Malta for leave of absence. Thanks also to David Milne
for his critical commentary on an earlier, and poorer, draft.
1 See, for example, quality soaps from Fiji or fruit preserves from Prince Edward
Island. These are reported in Baldacchino (1999a, 1999b, 2002).
2 On manufacturing in Iceland, Ireland and the Isle of Man, see Baldacchino and
Milne, 2000, passim.
3 Doumenge (1998, p 339) considers that the political demands of a minority of about
15–20 per cent of a population become potentially problematic to reconcile in a
jurisdiction. The Turkish minority in Cyprus represented some 18 per cent of the
population of the island in 1974.
4 Strange that maps of the island people used to portray ‘ethnic harmony’ are never-
theless displayed with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities clearly
labelled. The difference must matter enough to be registered.
5 This statement is valid as at early January 2002.
6 See Royle (2000, p 151) and his map of ‘divided islands’.
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